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ho among you has forgotten about the cousin? He is 
so eager to write the Spanish Metamorphosis, and the 
continuation of Polydore Vergil’s De inventoribus 
rerum. He wants to tell you who the Giralda of Seville and 
the Fuente del Piojo were; he wants to enlighten you about 
the first person who ever had a cold, and the person who 
invented a medicine against syphilis. You probably remember 
that Sancho pulls his leg, asking him who was the first who 
scratched his head, or who was the one who preceded 
everybody else in turning a somersault. It’s Sancho himself 
who gives the right answer –Adam and Lucifer, respectively. 
Don Quijote cannot believe that Sancho came up with the 
questions and answers on his own, but the squire retorts 
that he does not need any authority to talk nonsense. 
 
“Más has dicho, Sancho, de lo que sabes –dijo don 
Quijote—que hay algunos que se cansan en saber y 
averiguar cosas que después de sabidas y averiguadas 
no importan un ardite al entendimiento ni a la 
memoria.” (DQ 2. 22; ed. Rico, 813-14). 
 
The cousin is simply possessed by the natural desire of 
knowledge with which Aristotle begins his Metaphysics 
(980a). He is powerfully driven by a sense of curiosity 
that means two different things: the urge to investigate 
things unbeknownst to him that he considers interesting 
(curiosus), and the parallel need to be careful, curosus, 
W 
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in the ways in which he performs this investigation. The 
cousin may seem to us, and to don Quijote and Sancho, the 
epitome of those who fill the world with superfluous 
things, and as Nietzsche said,  
 
“the superfluous is the enemy of the necessary [das 
Überflüssige der Feind des Notwendigen ist]. We need 
history, certainly, but we need it for reasons 
different from those for which the idler in the garden 
of knowledge needs it [als sie der verwöhnte 
Müßiggänger im Garten des Wissens braucht], even 
though he may look nobly down on our rough and 
charmless needs and requirements.”1  
 
Finding out who was the first to invent a cup of glass 
and how it was used to contain wine may seem superfluous. 
It may very well look like the kind of knowledge that 
better fits in a vitrine to be publicly exhibited but 
rarely used, if at all. 
 
 The wine glass, however, is a very good case to 
examine.  In fact, I chose it purposefully, of course. This 
example allows us to get into direct contact with the text 
I am going to be using as my primary source, Alfonso de 
Toledo’s Invencionario, written some time between 1460 and 
1467, and dedicated to Alonso Carrillo de Acuña, the 
Primate Cardinal of Spain and factotum of most of the 
crucial political events, most of them of a rare violence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life”. Untimely Meditations. Daniel Breazeale, ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Philosophy), 1997: 59.  
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that took place in the Iberian kingdoms between 1460 and 
1482. 
 
The Bachiller Alfonso de Toledo, an unexpected 
predecessor of both the cousin and Polydore Vergil, gives 
us indeed the origin of glass at the same time as he is 
writing about the invention of wine. Both inventions go 
hand in hand: wine gives him the ability to understand its 
dangers, and to explain who is forbidden from drinking it; 
the invention of glass, at its turn, gives him the 
opportunity to offer us the following account about how 
this material challenged the preeminence of other 
materials: 
 
“Commo quier que segunt paresçe el vidrio non es saldo 
& mucho de ligero se quiebra pero ya se lee vn maestro 
aver presentado al emperador tiberio / vn vaso de 
vidrio E commo el en poco lo toujese lançolo en tierra 
el qual non se quebro mas bollose El maestro saco vn 
martillo que enel seño traya adobo el vaso commo si 
fuera de plata El emperador pregunto al maestro sy 
auja otro enel mundo que aquella arte sopiese & el 
rrespondio que non Entonçes el enperador mando lo 
matar porquel era muy avariento & avia mucho oro E si 
esta arte se sopiese que el vidrio se pudiese solidar 
commo otro metal valdria mas que oro & en su 
conparaçion seria rreputado por lodo.” (BNM Mss/9219, 
29v; Gericke ed. 53) 
 
Immediately afterwards, the combination of both inventions, 
offers our author the occasion to go beyond the fact of the 
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invention, and even beyond the short historical account, in 
order to reach into the world of irony and humor: 
 
“ya seria tiempo de dar fin aesta materia del vjno 
saluo que me copellen los potadores que les diga 
quando acaesçio que lloujese del çielo larga mente 
pluuja de vjno por que si verdat fue ternan esperança 
que por ventura otra vez tornara a llouer // Ca de las 
cosas que ya acaesçieron posible es qu[e] [o]tra vez 
acaescan” (BNM Mss/9219, 29v-30r; Gericke ed. 53) 
 
You have already guessed what I was trying to say. The 
invention of wine and glass are not just a way to establish 
a series of more or less curious facts. The narratives 
surrounding these inventions are also devised to give a 
hint of how they allow us, readers, to reach beyond the 
purported mission of this compilation –namely, registering 
inventions and inventors. In the first place, wine is not 
just an invention, something people found out; as our 
bachiller explains from the get go, wine is the result of 
extremely hard rural work, and it’s also all the more 
valuable when we consider that the moment of consumption is 
separated from the beginnings of its production by months 
or even years and very hard physical and intellectual work 
(p.20). For him, the production of wine is the perfect 
example that “para mantener un hombre son necesarios mucho 
hombres” (21). Furthermore, talking about the invention of 
wine is also a way to talk about certain boundaries that 
have a social impact: virgins, for instance, cannot drink 
wine, because, as we are reminded by the story of no less a 
person as Noah, the day he was drunk as a skunk and showing 
off his holy genitalia, wine is an aphrodisiac. This may or 
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may not be sufficiently compelling, but the history of the 
invention of glass indeed is quite compelling. In this 
case, the political and economical reading is much more 
complex; the production of glass, and the knowledge about 
mastering glasswork, has a certain economic impact, so much 
so that it could have been the cause why the standard of 
wealth would have shifted from gold and silver, thus 
unbalancing the very Emperor’s power –since the secret 
remained a secret, Tiberius could still preserve the value 
of his capital, and the gold standard itself. Finally, the 
invention of wine and the glass of wine is a window to a 
piece of history beginning with humor, a collective of 
ghost drinkers asking for a rainfall of wine, in order to 
focus on two sacred stories that permit the author to evoke 
particular miracles from different sources, evangelical and 
others (p. 53), thus establishing the very metaphysics of 
wine –the very same quality that makes it a central element 
in the miracle of communion, once it becomes blood2.  
 
A good question, here, would be not how and from what 
sources this work was compiled –something that will 
interest us for other reasons—but what is the intellectual 
contribution of the invention of invention. Or, in other 
words, we can ask why create a body of temporal and sacred 
knowledge from the perspective of invention? In this sense, 
what we need to understand is what kind of epistemological 
device or epistemological claim is the concept of invention 
and how it encompasses an idea and practice of research. 
This is what I intend to focus on in this paper. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gil Anidjar. Blood. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2015. 
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The bibliography about Alfonso de Toledo’s 
Invencionario fits in a thimble. Philipp Otto Gericke 
published it in 1967 and 1992, after reading an article 
about Raúl del Piero published in 1962; Gericke’s edition 
garnered two reviews, one by Francisco Marcos Marín, and 
another one by Juan Carlos Conde López; Concepción Salinas 
Espinosa presented a paper in Alcalá, 1992, giving a 
general description of the external elements of the work, 
and then mentioned it also en passant in his book about 
Alfonso de la Torre’s Visión deleytable; José Luis Herreros 
published an article in 1995 about the “order of knowledge” 
in the Invencionario, to demonstrate that it was a witness 
of the transition between the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance –and, along the way, he gave a wrong date for 
its composition. In the 2000’s, the work was the object of 
an entry in the Diccionario Filológico de Literatura 
Medieval, by my dear friend Fernando Gómez Redondo, who 
also devoted to the work pages 3702-3717 of his monumental 
Historia de la Prosa Medieval Castellana (2007). As always, 
Gómez Redondo wraps up what we know about the work, 
relocates it in its historical moment (the literary and 
intellectual circle of Alonso Carrillo), and corrects some 
details, while giving us a general taste of the text. I 
remember very well my first acquaintance with this text in 
1993, for a paper I presented while I was a graduate 
student in Paris. I got a good grade, thank you. 
 
It is slightly perplexing this lack of interest for a 
work of which we know twelve manuscripts that have been 
heavily used, and we are sure of the existence –and 
vanishing—of three more. I would also like to mention that 
we know of another one –a sixteenth manuscript, 
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corresponding to the exemplar prepared by Alfonso de Toledo 
himself, in which all the bibliographical references were 
in the margins, as he himself explains in the concluding 
chapter of his work. None of the extant manuscripts 
corresponds to the layout with which it was first conceived 
–or invented—and, as happened in many other occasions, the 
scribes decided that it was much easier to migrate all 
marginal information to the center of the manuscript, thus 
confusing the main text with the originally marginal 
cotaçiones and glosses. In a sense, this only matters a 
bit, because successive readers from the second half of the 
fifteenth century left dozens of reading marks, references, 
ordinationes, and longer glosses, on the margins of Alfonso 
de Toledo’s work. In other words, the Invencionario is not 
only one of the most read treatises of the second half of 
the fifteenth century, but also one that has received more 
marginal interactions from many different readers on the 
surface of the twelve extant manuscripts. [SOME SLIDES] If 
nothing else, the work should have generated some 
curiosity. 
 
And in fact it did. Some of those inventions 
registered by the bachiller were also re-used in some other 
texts of the period, including almost verbatim references 
by the translator of Guido de Cauliaco’s Chirgurgia, who 
included a mention about the invention of the tristel 
(basically a system to administer enemas, which may very 
well explain the very descriptive name in Spanish), based 
on the bio-mimicry of the way in which the stark purges 
itself –you really don’t want to know. Also, Antonio de 
Nebrija seems to follow Alfonso de Toledo in his chapter 
about the invention of letters in his Gramática. It is 
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quite easy to find the impact of the reading of the 
Invencionario in the late fifteenth century, but it would 
not be much more difficult to see its presence in other 
sixteenth century polyantheae, including Pedro Mexía’s 
Silva de varia lección –even though Mexía knew the two 
editions of Polydore Vergil’s De inventoribus, 1499 and 
1521. 
 
In other words, a case about the Invencionario is not 
just a matter of mere curiosity. It is in fact a compelling 
case about one vernacular treatise on how to manage 
scholarly information in a way that is, at the same time, 
useful, and funny, as “omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile 
dulci / lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.” However, 
this case is not a sufficient reason to simply stand here 
and tell you how interesting and funny this treatise is, 
and how unjustly it has been treated by our literary 
historian forefathers, and that it is time for us to 
celebrate its interest and so on and so forth. I am not 
going to do that –perhaps I already did, using the old art 
of preterition. 
 
Alfonso de Toledo puts into circulation two different 
concepts that constitute the backbone of his text. On the 
one hand, he does explore the concept of invention. 
Invention is a very recent word in Spanish at the time he 
is writing. It would be possible to trace its origins to 
two different traditions that are almost contemporary to 
our bachiller. On the one hand the knightly tradition of 
the invençión, which refers to the combination of image and 
text sported by literary and real knights in jousts and 
tournaments, and whose poetic fortune can be easily 
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explored among the thousands of cancionero poems. The 
second one is closely related to this knightly concept, as 
it has the same rhetorical origin –Alonso de Cartagena’s 
translation of book 1 of Cicero’s De inventione. The first 
uses of the noun invention in Spanish can be traced back to 
the years in which these two traditions first start. The 
word has a very long history in Latin, and, as a matter of 
fact one could very well affirm –examining the linguistic 
data—that Alfonso de Toledo is not even considering the 
Spanish tradition of the word, but rather creating a new 
semantic for a noun that he is directly translating from 
Latin. True that he is not translating one single noun, but 
rather reconducting a whole semantic field into one single 
noun. For instance, when he translates Petrus Comestor’s 
incidentia in which he speaks about the invention of 
torture and the instruments of torture, he establishes the 
synonymity between “excogitar” and “inventar”, as the 
Historia Scholastica reads: 
 
“In diebus Cyri septimus rex Romanorum Tarquinius 
Superbus, qui causa Tarquinii Junioris filii, sui, qui 
Lucretiam corruperat, a regno expulsus est. Hic genera 
tormentorum excogitavit, vincula, taureas fustes, 
latumias, carceres, compedes, catenas, exsilia, 
metalla.” (PL col. 1474d) 
 
The regime of synonymity comes most probably from the very 
definition of invention given by Cicero in his De 
invention, which is 
 
“excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium quae 
causam probabilem reddant.” 
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In other words, what Alfonso de Toledo is offering is not 
only the reinvention of the old and by then almost 
forgotten tradition of heurematography, but rather a 
treatise of what does it mean to scream εὕρηκα: what is an 
invention, what is the world of inventions, how many ways 
are there to talk about inventions, what is the literary 
style appropriate to narrate inventions, how to find out 
what is an invention, and what is the semantic field of 
invention. And, of course, what are the conditions of 
possibility, the historical opportunities, and the 
consequences of inventing. 
 
 There is absolutely no way that that I can reel off 
every single argument related to each of those ideas. There 
would be too much to say, not enough time. But I think I 
can make my point if I simply follow one lead –the 
juridical taste of the very concept of invention—and try to 
explain one of the inventive plots that crosses the 
treatise. First of all, let me clarify that the juridical 
taste I refer to is related to the previous definition of 
inventio from Cicero: inventing is not only about reasoning 
and finding out true or likely arguments, but also to work 
them out so that they allow the orator (or the dictator) to 
present the right proofs for the cause in point. Alfonso de 
Toledo is, indeed, a bachiller, that is a lesser kind of 
lawyer, who introduces himself as a dictator –an expert in 
the arts of dictating and writing letters. 
 
 He has taken the time to establish a series of 
stylistic paradigms for his dictamen. Very quickly, he 
divided the treatise in two parts, one devoted to temporal 
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inventions and the other one devoted to spiritual ones. 
Each part is divided in ten particles, each of which 
encompasses several chapters . Each part, as well, has its 
own measure of time; for the temporal part he has chosen 
the structure of the six ages of mankind, and for the 
second one the model of the traditio legis, that is the 
period of the law of nature, the period of the law of 
scripture, and the period of the law of grace. His style as 
a dictator is noteworthy because of the pleasure he seems 
to be taking out of his work; he is constantly trying to 
find a balance between brevity and clarity, with a 
rhetorical variety of humor that involves the whole 
organization of the book. For instance, it is frequent for 
him to show us how the next particle is already pressing 
him to finish the current one, using the trope of 
anthropomorphism: it is easy to read 
 
“Ya es tiempo que oyamos la razon de la Particula 
Nouena, a quien la Octaua, con su soberuia ha vn rato 
enbaraçado; la qual nos ha prometido declarer los 
inuentores de algunas artes que los ombres 
ynuentaron…” (fol. 41v; p. 71)  
 
This play with the particles who get in the way of the 
other particles, or claim their right to be listened to, 
etc., is combined with his ability to name some chapters in 
ways that could not be clearer, like the one titled “De vna 
vtil compendiosa diuision nesçesaria para declaraçion de lo 
ynfra notado” (96), or “En que permite alguna diuision para 
adelante” (140). From the very beginning Alfonso de Toledo 
has decided that he will be making the text “agradable”, 
and this is basically what he is doing: parsing some 
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variety not only in the kind of stories and inventions he 
is telling, but also in the way he is doing it. 
 
 However, this style, bubbly and crispy in many 
occasions, should not distract us from the bachiller’s 
interest in bringing up some real concepts and questions. 
All four or five scholars who have actually read, and 
bothered to write about the Invencionario have more or less 
repeated the same tune –it is a medieval work, not even 
close to the good and fruitful humanistic endeavors, better 
represented by, for instance, Polydore Virgil, the fellow 
heuromatographer from Urbino. The sources used by Alfonso 
de Toledo are the proof: Petrus Comestor, Uguccio da Pisa, 
Accursius, Isidore –god forbid- of Seville, Gratian, and 
others of the same ilk. Medieval medievals from the 
medieval middle ages. I am not going to deny it. I am just 
going to deny that this actually means anything at all. 
What really means something is whether he brings up all 
those sources and inventions for some particular purpose. 
And I think the purpose is the very concept of research, 
investigación, that is the semantic mantra of Alfonso de 
Toledo’s work. This is the endeavor: if we want to know 
about our institutions, customs, laws, and in general about 
which are the inventions and findings that identify our 
culture, we need to set in motion a series of researches. 
This is what matters: research, and a way to make this 
research transparent. 
 
 The verb investigar is quite recent in Spanish. It 
appears with Enrique de Villena, who becomes the champion 
of investigating, not for himself, but in the benefit of 
the “curosos leedores” (Cátedra ed. Villena, Eneida. 
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Madrid: Turner, 1994, p. 449). The activity of intellectual 
research called investigación constitutes a new trend in 
cultural production during the fifteenth century, one that 
Villena and the whole world of the city and network of 
Cuenca intellectuals –like Villena himself, or Alonso 
Carrillo de Acuña, the interlocutor of Alfonso de Toledo—
were very eager to practice in many different ways. They 
not only wanted to let people know things, but also to 
establish a valid series of methods and intellectual 
inquiry called investigación. Invención and investigación 
go hand in hand in Alfonso de Toledo’s intellectual 
activity. 
 
 But why investigación. True, every single page of 
Alfonso de Toledo uses the verb investigar or the noun 
investigación at least once in each page. In my opinion, 
however, this interest in research is not independent from 
his legalistic view of the world. Research is, above all, 
judicial and legal research. The whole Invencionario is 
fundamentally about legal institutions, or about the legal 
uses of certain bodies of knowledge. He is interested in 
the invention of the letters, scripts, and writing 
materials because they are extremely useful for legal 
purposes, or, in other words, because they constitute 
juridical memory –that is, archive. If he devotes time to 
those issues it is because they have legal consequences: 
investigating the invention of letters, scripts, the order 
of writing (from boustrophedon to plain unidirectional) and 
writing materials, allows him to establish the basic and 




 Legal and juridical inventions and investigation is a 
central part of what Alfonso de Toledo does. In the 
exemplar, now lost, the bachiller included all the 
references or remissions on the margins, in addition to the 
final chapter in which he explains the sources he has used, 
and the way he has used them. He is proposing a genealogy 
of those inventions, in order to demonstrate that they can 
be traced back to sources that are eminently juridical –
including Petrus Comestor’s Historia Scholastica, 
frequently used as a legal historical text as much as a 
text about legal history. In a certain way, the work itself 
is an inquest, a pesquisa, or, if you prefer the latin 
technical noun, an inquisitio. 
 
 Inquisitio is research in is purest state. Contrary to 
accusatorial models, inquisitio does not depend on anybody 
denouncing anybody. It is strictly a necessity to know, to 
search, to find out –to invent. As Michel Foucault 
explained in his lectures on “La vérité et les forms 
juridiques”, the inquest is a “processus de gouvernement”, 
and this is the reason why it occupies a prominent space in 
legal discussions. As a matter of fact, Alfonso de Toledo, 
who is particularly interested in some institutions, 
reduces his legal history to three problems: the invention 
of legal codifications, the invention of witnessing as a 
means of investigation, and, immediately afterwards, the 
invention of the inquisitio or pesquisa. This is, I would 
argue, where the interest in the double device of invention 
and investigation arrives at its theoretical peak. Writing 
and legal research reaches one particular way of government 
based on the inquest, that is, the constant process of 
research in the legal and political domains without the 
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mediation of any denouncement whatsoever, strictly based on 
what Alfonso de Toledo translates as the “fama clamante”. 
“Fama clamante” is the juridical and judicial effect 
produced by a strange agent which can be described as 
public knowledge, opinion, and intrigue. This is the kind 
of judicial process that entails the use of witnesses, who, 
as Alfonso de Toledo says, are “instrumento para la 
investigaçion de la verdat”, and if they came about as such 
essential pieces of investigation it is precisely because 
they originated in the very world of inquisition. 
 
 Like many other authors in his time, Alfonso de Toledo 
is interested in finding out the origins of the inquisition 
as a procedural system and as a governmental process. This 
is a question that many intellectuals were wondering. They 
knew that the legal origins of modern inquisition could be 
located in the third and fourth lateran councils. Iberian 
lawyers, furthermore, knew that Alfonso X had implemented 
an extremely original vernacular, civil and royal 
inquisition in his Third Partida. Still, they considered 
that the inquisition, the inquest, was a system of research 
set in motion by god not for him to know or to discover, 
but for establishing a superstructural of self-inquest 
among humans, who would thus take care of their own 
production of “fame” –and this is pretty much how Alfonso 
de Toledo explains is. Another manuscript, almost 
contemporary of the bachiller’s work, and definitely 
contemporary of many of his readers, introduces a gloss 
underneath an image of the story of Cain and Abel, in which 
the anonymous glossator offers as well his or her take on 
the origins of the inquisition [SLIDE]: 
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[ass]i como abel fue muerto 
[di]os como aquel que no se le as 
[co]nde nada. Pregunto a cayn 
[que] es de tu hermano abel & 
[ca]yn respondio quel non era gu 
[ar]da de abel que non sabia. & Di 
[xo] dios la su sangre llama 
[an]te mi. Estonçe dixo cayn 
[por] el peccado que he fecho que 
[qu]al quien que me fallare que me  
[m]ate./ E dixo dios non assy 
[m]as quien a ti matare que aya 
[do]ble peccado que tu. E dixo ca 
[yn] tan grande es el mi pe 
[cca]do que non meresco aver perdon 
[e] por esto que de suso dize que la 
[sa]ngre de cayn llama ante 
[si]. La justizia puede fazer 
[in]quisiçion & pesquisa de ley di 
[vi]na sobre algund malefiçio 
[que] sea fecho sin dar querella. (BNM Mss/1518, 30v) 
 
“Fama clamante” and the absence of a previous “querella” is 
what makes important research and the legally loaded 
concept of invention as “excogitatio” –that is, as the 
ability to articulate the truthful and the likely in order 
to present a proof during the judicial process. It is a 
powerful system of centralization of government, one that 
allowed for the configuration of a system of surveillance 
and an ability to listen to the claims of fame. If it had 
been fruitful –albeit rarely used—in civil causes during  
the 13th century, during the second half of the fifteenth 
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century it would become the center of gravity of a new 
jurisdictional power, or, as Bradin Cormack said, a power 
to do justice. 
 
 Curiosity is a very tricky notion. It can be easily 
judged a superficial interest in varied things that do not 
amount to anything other than an idle walk in the garden of 
knowledge. It would be difficult to understand, for 
instance, that today’s public intellectuals or public 
humanists would be driven by curiosity alone. We would need 
to articulate something more –moral philosophies, as Butler 
suggests in her Giving an account of oneself—that can make 
the whole conversation relevant. I don’t think it was 
different in the past, when researching, writing, 
translating, and disseminating knowledge was not something 
anybody could take for granted. 
 
 Alfonso de Toledo was, indeed, a curious guy. But he 
was doing something with his curiosity. He was, for 
instance, researching and translating. He was focusing on 
particular themes and institutions, and giving a legal and 
juridical reading of them –he, as he confesses, has very 
little theology to forget, so even theological inventions 
are, for here, legal achievements. He was indeed 
articulating a series of arguments with which to feed a 
political conversation that occupied an important part of 
public life, in peace and war, during the second half of 
the fifteenth century, and in particular after the Toledo 
revolts against the Jews in 1455: whether the inquisitorial 
system was not just a religious system, but also a civil 
and political governmental process. 
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 Invention and investigation are two crucial concepts 
that allow our bachiller to discover arguments to feed some 
of the debates that were taking place in public life, and, 
in particular, in such a powerful space as that surrounding 
the Primate of Spain and Isabel supporter, Alonso Carrillo 
de Acuña. Alfonso de Toledo was not only the discovery of 
those arguments, he also put them in the vernacular, so 
that they could be consistently used among those in charge 
of governing the kingdom after a succession of civil wars 
and other banderías. 
 
 Not heurematography, but, rather, the politics of 
heurematography. The invention of invention is, in fact, 
the invention of investigation: invention as 
epistemological device is the way to introduce the action 
that does not need of any sort of hint, denouncement, or 
accusation, but that unfolds and releases research. Of 
course, such investigation is no less than a much more 
perverse sort of curiosity: the inner thoughts, feelings, 
and beliefs of those new subjects of an inquisition. 
